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Article 7

Notes On Recent Cases
DIVORCE -

Grounds -

Cruelty -

Necessity of

Actual Physical Violence - In a suit for divorce upon the
ground of extreme cruelty complainant charged that the
defendant 'fdid upon several occasions threaten to leave your
oratix and to go to another country," said threats causing
her extreme suffering to the extent that her health was
greatly impaired. Held, this allegation, if proven, could
not justify the granting of a decree of divorce; that a divorce
upon the ground of extreme cruelty will be denied in the
absence of actual physical violence, unless the treatment
complained of injures health or renders cohabitation unsafe
and intolerable.-Chisholm v. Chisholm (Florida, 1930),
125 So. 694.
The court in the instant case followed the ruling in
Kellogg v. Kellogg, 93 Fla. 261, 111 So. 637, in holding that
extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce is "such conduct as
endangers life or health, or causes reasonable apprehension
of bodily hurt; mere inconvenience, unhappiness, or incompatibility of temperament or disposition, rendering marriage
disagreeable or even burdensome, does not authorize a decree
of divorce for extreme cruelty." This modern definition of
cruelty seems to be substantially the same in the greater
number of jurisdictions. White v. White (W. Va., 1929),
146 S. E. 720; McCullough v. McCullough (Texas, 1929),
20 S. W. (2d) 224; Henricksen v. Henricksen (Iowa,
1928), 216 N. W. 636; Wermerling v. Wermerling, 217
Ky. 126, 288 S. W. 1050; Krouss v. Krouss, 163 La. 218,
111 So. 683; McCurdy v. McCurdy, 123 Okla. 295, 253
Pac. 295. Danger of life, limb, or health are necessary to
constitute "cruelty." McKane v. McKane (Maryland,
1927), 137 Atl. 288. But a divorce for legal cruelty in
Proudfoot v. Proudfoot, 154 Md. 585, was not granted
where the conduct of husband and wife was on parity and
the wife's health was not endangered. Reaction of husband's treatment upon wife often furnishes great weight in
a divorce suit on the ground of cruelty. A husband repeatedly choked his wife in the case of Began v. Began (N. J.

THs NoTRE DAMS LAWYER

Ch., 1927), 135 Ati. 478, and it was held not extreme
cruelty where the wife was not made afraid.
The ancient rule that actual bodily harm or apprehension of actual bodily harm is necessary to constitute cruelty
as a ground for divorce has been repudiated almost universally. Today the rule has been extended in most jurisdictions to include even mental suffering. Horkheimer v.
Horkheimer (W. Va., 1929), 146 S. E. 614 (2d case);
Feyerherm v. Feyerherm (1928), 128 Okla. 147, 262 Pac.
199. In Miller v. Miller (1928),223 Ky. 537, 4 S. W. (2d)
363, it was held that insults and neglect of wife, producing
and aggravating mental anguish and wounded feelings, are
as cruel within the divorce statute "as actual bruising of
the person. However, this rule cannot be applied too
broadly. In the divorce complaint in the case of Heinemann
v. Heinemann (Oregon, 1926), 245 Pac. 1082, a charge of
impotency was made, but the court held that this was not
a ground for divorce, unless it was wanton and malicious
and causing defendant such mental suffering as to be injurious to health.
Illinois seems to adhere, to a greater extent, to the
ancient doctrine in regard to the necessity of actual physical
violence or apprehension thereof in order to constitute legal
cruelty. In Trenchard v. Trenchard, 245 Ill. 313, the wife
filed a bill for divorce on the ground of cruelty alleging that
her husband used physical violence (shaking her with excessive force on one occasion, and at another time pushing
her violently against a door). The court found that the
bill did not show facts that the acts were committed in
anger, without justifiable provocation or that the wife was
injured on either occasion, or that as a result the wife may
have reasonably feared she would be in danger if she continued to live with him, and consequently the court held
that the bill did not state a case of extreme and repeated
cruelty within the statute authorizing a divorce on that
ground.
Although it is true that the term "cruelty" as defined
in Kellogg v. Kellogg, supra, seems to be in substance the
general interpretation given to that term by most courts,
yet it remains that in view of the incongruous decisions which
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are repeatedly arrived at by the different states, the inability and impossibility of our courts to adopt a definite
and universal interpretation of. that term is most obvious.
Our state statutes concerning divorce, and concerning the
essential elements involved in that branch of the law, is the
principal source from which the inconsistencies are developed. In many instances the inconsistency arises by reason
of the vast diversity of opinion of our judges who are authorized to grant the divorce decree. As a matter of fact, the
disparity of the laws among our states on this subject is
so great that in the eyes of the laws of one state a man may
be divorced, whereas the status of this same individual in
another jurisdiction will assume an entirely different aspect.
It is a common observation that the dissolution of the marriage status requires the consideration of very delicate principles. However liberal our courts are treating this problem, or however great is the lack of harmony among the
states in establishing divorce laws, the very nature of the
relationship with which we are dealing will necessarily
govern the extension of the legal principles adopted.
-J.

P.

GUADNOLA.

ACTION-Injury to person and damage to vehicle
give rise to distinct causes of action, though resulting from
a single tortious act.-Clancey v. MicB7ide (111) 169 N.
E. 729.

Automobiles of the plaintiff and defendant collided at
an intersection, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff and
damages to her automobile. The plaintiff sued and recovered damages for the injuries to her car, and then started
an action for injuries to herself. The defendant interposed
the former judgment as a bar to this action, contending that
the injuries amounted to only one cause of action. The
court reversed the decision of the appellate court in favor
of the plaintiff, holding that "while causes of action for injuries to person and damage to his property as a result of
the same negligent act may be joined in a single suit in a
court of competent jurisdiction, recovery of judgment for
damage to property is not a bar to a subsequent action to
recover damages for injuries to the person.,,
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This case seems to be in conflict with the great weight
of authority on the question of whether or not an injury to
person and personal property arising out of the same act
amounts to one cause of action or several. In deciding as
it did, the Illinois court followed the rule followed by the
New York court and courts of England. The reasoning of
the courts holding that there are two causes of action is
that the period of limitations for the two causes are different,
and that one right is assignable and survives death of either
party while the other is not assignable and does not so survive. Cases holding that an injury to the person and damage
to the property resulting from the same wrongful act gives
rise to a distinct cause of action for each of the rights infringed are; Brundsen v. Humphrey, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div.
141; Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N. Y. 40;
Ochs v. Public Service Railway Co., (N. J.) 80 A. 495;
Watson v. Texas and Pacific Railway Co., (Texas) 27
S. WA.924. The case of Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving
Co., Supra, was criticised in Mcl1nerney v. Main, 81 N. Y.
S. 539 (1920), and see also Van Ommen v. Hageman, (N.
J.) 126 A. 468.
A single wrongful act, which causes injury or damage
with respect to different rights, creates but one cause of
action. Birmingham Southern Railroad Co. v. Lintner,
(Ala.), 38 So. 363; Jenkins v. Skelton, (Ariz.) 192 P. 249;
Segar v. Town of Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290; Cassidy v.
Berkovitz, (Ky.) 185 S. W. 129; Doran v. Cohen, (Mass.)
17 N. E. 647; King v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. PaulRailway Co., (Minn.) 82 N. W. 1113; Kimball v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co., (Miss.) 48 So. 230; Fields v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (Pa.) 117 A. 59; Smith
v. C., N. 0. & T. P. Railway Co., (Tenn.) 189 S. W. 367;
Sprague v. Adams, (Wash.) 247 P. 960. The reasoning
usually given for this rule is that since the acts involved
and much the greater part of the testimony is identical,
there is but a single cause. Moreover it is more convenient
to settle a dispute of this kind in one rather than in several
distinct suits.
In my opinion, the supreme court of Illinois was wrong
when they reversed the decision of the Appellate court. The
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very courts of New York and New Jersey have in their
later decisions shown a tendency towards the more liberal
rule; and it is on the decision of these courts that they based
their decision. Then, too, a rule leading to two lawsuits
where one will accomplish the same results is not to be
favored.

KENNETH J.

KONOP.

AUTOMOBILES-In automobile collision case, evidence that the plaintiff's license was suspended after accident held properly excluded. Peskin v. Buckley; 168 N.
E. 791 (Mass.)
This is an action of tort to recover damages for injuries
to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have
been sustained by reason of the negligent and unskillful
driving of an automobile by the defendant on a public highway in the city of Worcester. The case was tried to a jury
and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff.
There was evidence that, while the plaintiff was operating his automobile with due care, the defendant drove his
car "at an excessive rate of speed" upon and into the plaintiff's automobile, thereby causing the harm and damage
complained of. There was also evidence that the plaintiff
was not in the exercise of due care, and that the collision
was attributable in part to the negligent driving of the plaintiff's car.
Without objection or exception, the supervising inspector of the state registry of motor vehicles in Worcester
county testified that he partly investigated an automobile
accident in which the plaintiff was involved in November,
1926; that the plaintiff told him at the office of the registry
"he was crossing Washington Square at an estimated speed
of seventeen miles an hour, and that he was in collision with
this car which he hadn't seen up to the time of contact."
The defendant then asked the witness. "What official action
was taken in regard to Peskin's license?" Subject to the
exception of the defendant the judge excluded the answer
to the question and the defendant made an offer of proff in
substance "that the license of the plaintiff was suspended."
In support of the relevancy of the proffered evidence the
defendant relies on G. L. c. 90 22, which reads; "The registrar may suspend or revoke any certificate of registration
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or any license issued under this chapter, after due hearing,
for any cause which he may deem sufficient."
It is plain the mere suspension of the plaintiff's license
could have no relevancy, no rational tendency to prove want
of due care by the plaintiff, and it is obvious that- the fact
of the suspension. If admitted in evidence, would be prejudicial to the plaintiff. Beauregard v. Benjamin F. Smith
Co., 213 Mass. 259, 100 N. E. 627, 45 L. IR. A. (N. S.)
200 Ann. Cas. 1914A, 473. The evidence was rejected

rightly.

W'I.IAM JUDGE.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES. - Mortgagee suing
sheriff in trover for selling automobile seized under execution on judgment against mortgagor held entitled to possession without making demand. Burton v. Jennings, (Md.)
148 A. 424.
Appellee sued the appellant who had formerly been
sheriff at Baltimore county in an action of trover for -selling a Ford Sedan of one Clarkin on which appellee (Jennings) had a chattel mortgage, under a writ of fieri facias
issued out of one of the Law Courts of Baltimore city directing appellant (Burton) as sheriff of Baltimore county
to levy on the property of Clarkin, after the recording of
appellee's mortgage. The mortgage was recorded in Howard county where the mortgagor resided and in Baltimore
city where he was engaged in business. The Ford sedan
was now claimed to be the property of appellee by virtue
of a duly recorded mortgage in default of payment. The
levy was made and the automobile was seized in Baltimore
county as Clarkin was passing through. Burton had actual
notice of such mortgage arising from the recording thereof
and refused to give up the said automobile at the request
of Jennings and sold the same to one Linzey who took possession thereof and transferred it to others who are now
claiming the said automobile.
It is true, the sheriff had actual notice of the mortgage
and that it was properly recorded where the law required
it to be recorded and he was warned not to make the sale.
The plaintiff was entitled to possession. By the terms
of the mortgage the mortgagor agreed to surrender pos-
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session to the mortgagee on default. The mortgage was
in default.
The plaintiff could have filed a claimant's petition under
Code. Art. 9 *47. But he was not bound to do so. Richardson v. Hall (21 Md. 399), Corner v. Mackintosh (48
Md. 374), Kilpatrick v. O'connell (62 Md. 408), Keen v.
Doerner (62 Md. 475).
A demand by the mortgagee was not necessary under
the circumstances of this case, as a preliminary to the right
of possession by the mortgagee, as on the seizure of the
automobile by the sheriff it was no longer possible for the
mortgagor to comply with such a demand and it would
therefore have been ineffectual.
There appeared to be no evidence of any express demand on the sheriff for delivery of the automobile. However, there is evidence of a notice of the mortgage and of
the places of record, and that he would be held responsible
for appellee's "equity in the car." That was in fact, a warning that appellee was demanding all his rights, and put the
sheriff on inquiry as to what those rights were. On examination of the records to which he was referred would have disclosed that the mortgage was overdue and that the mortgagor was in default, and that he had agreed to surrender
the automobile to the appellee; that the very attempt to sell
the car by the sheriff would entitle the appellee to imnediate possession.
J. H. TUBERTY.
COMMONWEALTH v. CANTER.-Libel and
Slander-Words "Fuller-Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti" carried on placard held libelous per se. Commonwealth
v. Canter; 168 NE 790, (Mass.)
The defendant was indicted for criminal libel on Dec.
10, 1928; he pleaded "not guilty"; he was tried by a jury;
and on May 27, 1929, was found "guilty."
It appears from the record, and is not disputed by
the defendant, that about two o'clock on the afternoon of
Nov. 3, 1928, the defendant marched at the head of twentyfive persons in single line in front of the State House on
the State House side of Beacon street, Boston, Mass., for
seven or eight minutes; that he carried a placard bearing
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the words, "Fuller--Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti"; that
there were people on the same side of the street watching
the procession and about fifty or seventy-five people across
the street on the side of the Common. Aside from sauntering and loitering there was no breach of the peace and no
disorder. At the trial the defendant admitted that the placard carried by him referred to Alvan T. Fuller, then Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and that
"Sacco" and "Vanzetti" mentioned on the placard were
Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti who had been executed for the crime of murder in the Commonwealth. The
defendant, while under arrest at the station house, in reply
to the question of what the idea was of parading up and
down before the State House carrying the sign, said; "Because these men Sacco and Vanzetti had been executed
illegally and we think Governor Fuller is the man who is to
blame for the carrying out of the execution." The words,
"Fuller--Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti," taken in their
usual, natural and popular sense and without forced construction, import a charge of the most heinous crime known
to the law-wilful murder-and are libelous per se. Giving
to the words their prinary meaning the publication of them
was well calculated to injure the reputation of Governor
Fuller, to degrade him in society, to lower him in the confidence of the community, and to bring him into public hatred
and contempt. The defendant, not denying the publication
by him of the words displayed on the placard or the falsity
of them in so far as they import wilful murder, offered to
prove that the police officers and everybody else present
on the occasion of his arrest would testify that they understood the words used are used not in the sense that Governor
Fuller had been guilty of murder as set forth in the indictment, but that he was morally responsible for the deaths of
Sacco and Vanzetti, and contended that the question whether
such was the fact was purely a question of fact for the jury.
Based upon the presumed common knowledge that Sacco
and Vanzetti were executed by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts more than a year prior to the parade of the
defendant and others with the placard, the defendant contends that nobody could take the words published to mean

THE NoTRE DAME LAWYER

as stated in the indictment that Governor Fuller had been
guilty of murder with malice afordthought.
Disregarding as surplusage the inuendo of the indictment wherein the word "Murderer" as printed on the placard is defined as "meaning one who slays or kills with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, and meaning
that the said Alvan T. Fuller is guilty of the crime of
murder." Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick, 321, 335;
Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 254 Mass, 424, 150 N. E. 190,
it is plain the words of the placard when published were
not susceptible of meaning to the world that Governor
Fuller was not guilty of murder as a crime but was morally
responsible for the deaths of Sacco and Vanzetti, Thomas
v. Blasdale, 147 Mass., 438, 18 N. E. 214. It is not sufficient
for a defendant to show by arguments that words in form
libelous were not intended to be such in fact, where the words
published are not ambiguous and have a meaning that is
perfectly clear and well understood by everybody. There
was no error, in the refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant, in the refusal to receive the testimony offered to
prove that the words were used to mean only that Governor
Fuller was morally responsible for the deaths of Sacco and
Vanzetti, in the refusal to receive the testimony offered to
prove the truth of the publication assumed to have the mean
ing ascribed to the words by the defendant, in the denial of
the requests for rulings to which exception was taken, in the
exception taken to the charge, or in any of the exceptions
which have been argued.
WMoA]M JUDGE.
Chicago Title & Trust Co. vs. De Lasaux et al Supreme Court of Illinois, December 25, 1929.
Bill of interpleader by Chicago Title and Trust Co.
against De Lasaux and others to determine the ownership
of $1,000 held by it. Decree granting $150 to the Chicago
Title and Trust Company and $850 to F. W. Harsh, one
of the claimants of the $1,000 held by the Trust Company.
Affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. De Lasaux
brings certiorari. Affirmed by Supreme Court of Illinois.
It appears that De Lasaux contracted with Harsh, a
broker, to pay the latter three per cent commission if he
sold a particular lot located in Chicago. Harsh entered into
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a contract to sell the real estate to one Windham for $36,000.
By the terms of this agreement the vendee was to pay $1,000,
which incidentally is the money in question, to the Chicago
Title & Trust Co. and the balance was to be paid to De
Lasaux, vendor, when transfer was made. The deal was
closed, and the purchase price paid to vendor, except the
money held by trust company, and on account of which this
bill of interpleader is filed.
Plaintiff in error, De Lasaux, insists that under the
pleadings and evidence the Chicago Title and Trust Co. incurred an independent liability towards plat in error; that
the trust company had no lawful right to bring her into
a court of equity to litigate the claim of Harsh, broker,
against her; and that none of the essential elements necessary to grant relief prayed appear either in the bill or in
the evidence.
The court briefly set out the elements upon which the
equitable remedy of interpleader depends: First, the same
thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all of the
parties against whom the relief is demanded. (In the instant case the same thing-$1,000-was claimed by the
vendor and the broker). Second, all the adverse titles or
claims must be dependent on or derived from a common
source (here the common claim is derived from the sale of
the real estate). Third, the person asking the relief must
not have or claim any interest in the subject matter, (here
the trust company does not claim any interest or part of
the $1,000; it merely wants the true owner to have the
money). The fourth, and last requisite, is that the party
having the bill must have incurred no independent liability
to either claimant, that is, he must stand perfectly. indifferent
between them, in the position merely as stakeholder. (in the
present case the trust company held just that position; it
was under cohtractual obligation to neither vendor nor
broker).
Equity courts in America uniformly require the four
elements referred to in the preceding paragraph to be the
grounds of relief . . . 126 Ill. App. 493; 181 Ala. 338;
121 Mo. App. 442, 97 S. W. 200; 94 N. E. (Mass.) 271;
161 Mich. 521; 91 Conn. 444; 256 Pa. 363; 71 N. Y. S. 481;
65 N. Y. App. Div. 214.

TFii
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A bill of "interpleader" should not be confused with
a bill "in the nature of interpleader." A bill of "interpleader
is distinguished from a bill "in the nature of interpleader"
in that in the latter there are grounds of equitable jurisdiction other than the mere right to compel defendants to interplead, and complainant may seek some affirmative equitable
relief. 6 Ala. 362; 92 Ark. 446, 123 S. W. 233; 115 Ga. 97,
41 S. R. 272; 178 Ill. A. 551; 263 Ill. 453, 105 N. E. 319;
52 Ind. 218.
"While the assertion of perfect disinterestedness is an
essential ingredient of a bill of interpleader, no principle
of equity jurisprudence is violated by permitting a party
in interest to file a bill of that nature to ascertain and establish his own rights, where there are conflicting rights between third persons," RoyalTrust Co. v. Gardiner,44 App.
(D. C.) 570. For example, a bill in the nature of interpleader is a proper remedy where plaintiff is a mortgagor
seeking to redeem, and there are conflicting claims to mortgage money. 16 R. I. 417.
A line of demarcation should also be drawn between
the two bills already considered and a "bill of peace."
Equity in its descretion in order to prevent a multiplicity
of suits will adjust conflicting equities of many parties in
one suit. As in the case of a bill of interpleader there must
be a single issue before the courts will allow a bill of peace.
But in a bill of peace the complainant has an interest in the
outcome, whereas in a bill of interpleader the complainant
can have no interest in the subject matter. A bill in the
nature of interpleader and a bill of peace more closely resemble each other but they are dissimilar in as much as in
the former complainant seeks to enforce an equitable right,
whereas in the latter complainant's right is legal but in
being dealt with in equity for convenience-avoiding a multiplicity of suits.

WM. LE O'MALiEY.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES:-Key No. 43.-Diversity of citizenship to justify removal to Federal Court must
exist at the beginning of the suit -and at time petition for
removal was filed, and subsequent change of domicile does
not furnish justification for removal. (28 Usca Sect. 7i,

THE NOTRE DAwE LAWYER

P. 183). Southern Ry. Co. et al. v. Bailey, reported in 125
So. 403, (1929).
On the second trial of this case, in the Circuit Court, a
second petition for removal to the Federal Court was presented. A denial of relief on that petition is here assigned
as error. The latter petition for removal discloses that at
the time the action was commenced Plaintiff was a citizen
and resident of Alabama, but that she has removed her residence, and changed her citizenship, and is ndw a citizen of
Mississippi, and, on account of the diversity of citizenship
resulting from such change Defendant Railway Co. has the
right to remove this cause, and prays for an order to that
effect.
The court stated that it was well settled many years
ago by the Supreme Court of the United States that, to
justify the removal of a cause from a state to federal court
on account of diversity of citizenship, such diversity must
exist at the beginning of the suit and also when the petition
for removal was filed, and that the subsequent change of
domicile by Plaintiff from the state, did not furnish justification for a removal of the cause on the petition of the
Defendant. 108 U. S. 561, (Ohio), 2 S. Ct. 873, 27 L. Ed.
825; 117 U. S. 197, (Tenn.), 6 S. Ct. 669, 29 L. Ed. 888;
111 U. S. 358, (Texas), 28 L. Ed. 455; 130 U. S. 230,
(Mo.), 32 L. Ed. 914; 18 F. 657 (Wis.); 19 F. 881 (Cal.);
116 F. 471 (Wash.).
A case cannot be removed on the ground of diversity
of citizenship at the time of filing the petition for removal
unless such diversity existed also at the commencement of
the suit. 111 U. S. 358; 117 U. S. 197.
The right of removal depends upon the case disclosed
by the record when the petition for removal is fied. 230 F.
711 (D. C. Or. 1916); 163 Ark. 255, 259 S. W. 730; 210
N. Y. S. 243, 214 App. Div. 58.
Where a consolidation of a foreign with a domestic
railroad has not taken place till after suit is brought against
the foreign corporation by a domestic corporation, and the
filing of a petition for removal, the consolidation does not
alter the Defendant's right to a removal of the cause. See:
29 F. 337, (C. C. Iowa, 1886).
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In the present case, since it affirmatively appears on
the face of the petition, that when suit was brought, Plaintiff was a citizen of Alabama, we therefore conclude 'that
the Southern Ry. Co.'s petition of removal was properly
denied.
FRANCIS G. FEDDER.
MUNICIPALITIES :-City in maintaining a bathing beach in a city park was discharging a governmental
function, hence it was not liable to users thereof; charge
of a small fee for use of bathing suit and other conveniences
did not make the city liable to one injured while using
municipal bathing beach.
The city of St. Paul maintained a public park in which
there was situated a lake. A part of the lake and beach was
set apart for bathing and provided with diving scaffolds
and boards. Anyone was permitted to make use of these
facilities free of charge. There was a bathhouse situated
on a portion of the beach where bathing suits, towels and
lockers could be rented and soap purchased from the city.
The plaintiff went to the beach; rented a bathing suit, towel
and locker, and bought a piece of soap. He then went on
the diving board and dove into the water, but as he struck
the water, his head came into contact with some sharp substance which cut a gash in his head. He seeks to recover
damages from the city for the injury sustained. Held:
The city in the maintenance of bathing facilities in a public
park was discharging a governmental function and hence
not responsible for negligence to those making use of the
same. The court also held that the fact that the city provided
for a price the things needed by those making use of the
public bathing beach did not render the city liable. St. John
v. City of St. Paul, 228 N. W. 170 (Minn.)
Generally in reference to liability for torts, it is held
that a municipal corporation has a dual character, the one
public and the other private, or what is a more correct classification, the one governmental and the other proprietary.
By practically unanimous authority it is held that a city is
not liable for injuries resulting while the municipality is
acting in a governmental capacity. 256 U. S. 650; 31 Ala.
469; 94 Ark. 80; 178 Pac. 50 (Cal.); 132 A. 467 (Conn.);
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III N. E. 578 (Ill.); 112 N. E. 994 (Ind.); 209 N. W.

454 (Ia.); 270 S. W. 837 (Ky.); 149 N. E. 204 (Mass.);
198 N. W. 214 (Mich.); 191 N. W. 167 (Minn.); 225 S.
W. 934 (Mo.); 137 N. E. 24 (N. Y.); 140 N. E. 324
(Ohio); 124 A. 273 (Pa.)
It is just as universally held that when a municipality
is acting in a private or proprietary capacity, the city stands
on the same footing as a private corporation, and like such
private corporation is liable for injuries resulting from its
negligence while acting within the scope of the municipal
power. 256 U. S. 650; 124 S. W. 14 (Ark.); 81 A. 958
(Conn.); 111 N. E. 573 (II.); 114 N. E. 636 (Ind.) 207
N. W. 134 (Ia.) ; 67 N. E. 244 (Mass.); 121 N. W. 274
(Mich.); 211 S. W. 59 (Mo.); 99 N. E. 540 (N. Y.);
41 Ohio St. 149; 124 A. 273 (Pa.); 155 N. W. 127 (Wis.)
These general propositions are not controverted, but
the difficulty lies in determining whether the municipality
is acting in a governmental or in a proprietary capacity
under a certain state of facts. These functions have been
fairly well classified in most instances. However, the facts
as stated in the principal case have led to a contrariety of
decisions, in determining whether the municipality is carrying out governmental or proprietary functions.
In the case of Augustine v. Town of Brant, 163 N. E.
732 (N. Y.), the court, while admitting that there was a
conflict of authority on the question, held that a municipality in maintaining a bathing beach was acting in a proprietary and not in a governmental capacity, and so the
municipality was liable for injuries arising therefrom. Judge
Pound in rendering the decision stated that "The establishment of town parks, playgrounds and other similar places
is not a public duty imposed on the town, and the town does
not act as an agent of the state when it avails itself of the
privilege of maintaining them."
In Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 114 N. E. 722 (Mass.)
on an identical statement of facts, the Massachusetts court
holds squarely opposite to the preceding decision by the
New York court. In this case as in the principal case the
municipality charged a fee for the use of the beach, but the
court maintained that this fact did not prevent the city from
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acting in a governmental capacity. The court based its decision on the ground that the maintenance of free public
baths was in its essence a public benefit, and was for the
general good of all the public.
T. J. O'NEIL.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.-If building is defective when lease is executed, covenant requiring tenant to
repair will not relieve landlord from liability for injuries
caused by defect. Updegra/f v. City of Ottumwa. (Iowa)
226 N. W. 928!
The defendant was the owner of a building which he
had leased to the Kresge Company. Evidence shows that
a down spout which had been constructed on the side-of the
building and adjacent to the side walk had been defective
for months prior to the lease. This defect caused water, to
run over the sidewalk which collected and froze. After the
Kresge Company had taken possession of the building under
the lease, plaintiff .slipped and fell on ice which had formed
on the sidewalk, thereby sustaining injuries for which she
now seeks to recover. Court held that the plaintiff could
recover from the owner of the building in spite of an agreement in the lease requiring the lessee to "make any and all
repairs which may be necessary to said premises or any
part thereof."
The general rule that "the landlord who has parted
with full possession and control of his premises by lease to
a tenant is not liable for injuries to third persons caused
by the iiegligence of the tenant," is universally adopted by
all the states. But this immunity from liability does not
extend to cases where the injuries to. third persons results
from defects in the premises which existed at the time of
the execution of the lease. 64 Pac. 564 (Cal.); 27 Conn.
632; 89 S. E. 1099 (Ga.) ; 53 S. W. 452 (Ind.); 61 Pac.
689 (Kan.); 45 So. 258 (La.); 139 N. E. 379 (Mass.); 172
N. W. 491 (Minn.) ; 85 S. W. 915 (Mo.) ; 174 N. Y. S.
625; 67 N. E. 286 (Ohio); 123 A. 491 (Pa.); 96 S. E.
202 (Va.); 149 N. W. 489 (Wis.); 193 Pac. 61 (Cal.)
In the last case the court said that the nuisance must be
one which in its very essence and nature is a nuisance before the landlord can be held liable. If it is something which
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is capable of being thereafter rendered a nuisance by the
tenant, the landlord cannot be held liable.
Whether or not the landlord's liability, under the second rule, is relieved by the tenant's agreement in the lease
to make all necessary repairs is generally answered in the
negative. 91 N. E. 911 (Mass.); 225 Ill: App. 50; 137
N. B. 663 (Mass.); 59 N. Y. 28; 13 N. W. 499 (Mich.);
95 N. W. 224 (Minn.); 118 A. 99 (N. H.)
JOSEPH YOCH.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS. -

Municipal

council cannot delegate to a municipal officer the power to
decide upon legislative matters properly resting within its
judgment and discretion. State ex rel Srigley v. Woodworth, Safety Director. (Ohio) 169 N. E. 713.
. The relatrix in mandamus proceedings seeks to compel
the defendant, a city officer, to issue to her a permit authorizing her to build a gasoline filling station on her lot in
the city of Athens. The defendant justified his action on
the grounds that sections 13 and 14 of the city ordinance
number 512, provided that no filling stations should be
erected in a residential district of the city. In this case the
safety director, acting as building inspector, determinedfor himself that the street upon which the relatrix's property
was located was a residential district. It is this power of the
defendants, which permits him to say what part of the city
is residential and what part is not that the .relatrix objects
to and claims the ordinance is void because of. The court
of appeals awarded the writ of mandamus and ordered the
defendant to issue the permit on the grounds that a provision in an ordinance authorizing an inspector of buildings
to determine what part of the city belongs in various districts held void as an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
A municipal council cannot delegate to another munitipal officer the power to decide upon legislative matters properly resting in the judgment and discretion of the council.
The members of a council are chosen by the people to legislate, and the public is entitled to the judgment and discretion of those elected for that purpose, and not to the judg-
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ment and discretion of some other to whom the council may
confide it. 19 Ruling Case Law 896. In Jewell Belting
Co. v. Village of Bertha (Minn.) 97 N. W. 424, the court
said, "Ministerial duties such as are absolute, fixed, and
certain, involving no element of judgment or discretion, may
be delegated by the governing body of a municipality; but
discretionary powers must be exercised by the body itself."
The generally accepted rule is to the effect that a statute
or ordinance which vests arbitrary discretion with respect to
an ordinary lawful business, profession, appliance, etc., in
public officials, without prescribing a uniform rule of action,
or, in other words, which authorizes the issuing or withholding of licenses, permits, approvals, etc., according as the
designated officials arbitrarily choose, without reference to
all of the class to which the statute or ordinance under consideration was intended to apply, and without being controlled or guided by any definite rule or specified conditions
to which all similarly situated might knowingly conformis unconstitutional and void. 12 A. L. R. 1436.
Recent decisions holding that legislative functions cannot be delegated are, Varela v Bell, 10 Fed. (2d.) 989;
Moch Co. v. Renselaer Water Co., 217 N. Y. S. 426, holding that governmental functions of a city cannot be delegated. to a private corporation to make it immune from
liability; Poggel v. Louisville Ry. Co. (Ky.) 10 S. W. (2d)
305; Moore v. Logan, (Texas) 10 S. W. (2d) 428, deals
with delegation of powers where the municipal corporation
is under the commission form of government, and the same
rule applies.
Decisions holding that ministerial functions can be
delegated are, Walker v. Towle, (Ind.) 59 N. E. 20; May
v. Chicago, (Ill.) 140 N. E. 845; Milwaukee v. Rissling,
(Wis.) 199 N. W. 61; Burge v. Rockwell City, (Iowa) 94
N. W. 1103; and Mayfield v. Phipps, (Ky.) 263 S. W. 37.
Ohio decisions holding with the main case that when a
delegation of authority is purely legislative, the power cannot be delegated by the municipal council or governing body
are: Elyria Gas Co. v. Elyria, (Ohio) 49 N. E. 335; State
v. Bell, 340 Oh. St. 194;-Lillard.v..Ampt, 7 Oh. S. and
CP. 167.
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There is no conflict among the states as to the rules
laid down in this case. Where the conflict does arise, however, is when courts are attempting to determine whether or
not a delegation of authority, was a delegation of a legislative function or a judicial function.
Kw=ai KONOP.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.---"Injunction against transferring colored pupil from school for
white children to color school on the sole ground that the
distance was unreasonable, was held properly refused."
Wright v. Board of Education of Topeka, 284 P. 363.
This was an action to enjoin the board of education
from interfering with the attendance of W. Wright, a colored pupil at a school maintained for white children. P lives
within a few blocks of the Randolph school. The Buchanan
school is some twenty blocks from the P's residence. The
sole contention is that the D's order that P attend the
Buchanan school is unreasonable, because of the distance.
It is found that the D furnishes transportation by automobile bus for the P to and from the Buchanan school without
expense to her. The trial court properly held that the order
of the board of education was not so unreasonable that it
should be enjoined. Cases in agreement have been found
in Arkansas, Stephens v. Humphreys, 224 S.W. 442, 145
Ark. 172; Illinois, People v. Wabash By. Co., 121 N. E.
736, 286 II. 399; Nebraska, State v. Stoddard, 189 N. W.
299, 108 Neb. 712; Old. Lincoln County v. Matthews, 230
P. 739, 104 Okl. 185. In Wisconsin it was held that "An
act of a school board transferring a child with a defective
voice from one school to another would not be interfered
with by the courts." State v. Board of Education of Antigo.
172 N. W. 153, 169 Wis. 231.
Mississippi upheld the right of a school board to appoint the school which a child must attend when they found
that, "Persons of mixed blood having any appreciable
amount of negro blood are colored within the meaning of
the Constitution, as to separate schools." Moreau v.
Gandich, 75 So. 434, 144 Miss. 560.
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In cases, however, where the hoard abuses its discretion,
such abuse would make its order invalid. And a school that
is an unreasonable distance and the child's safety would be
jeopardized, would be such an abuse unless free transportation would be provided, thus eliminating the danger.
Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 P. 216,
22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 584.
Before such a prayer could be denied to the P, it must
have been lawful for the school board to discriminate between white and colored children and dictate to them, where
they should attend school. This power has been given the
board by statute which "authorized boards of education in
cities of the first class to organize and maintain separate
schools for the education of white and colored children."
(R. S. 72-1724).
This statute has been held valid in case of Board of
Education v. Welch, 51 Kan. 692, 33 P. 654. It was also
decided in Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672,
72 P. 274: "Such act does not violate the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the U. S. prohibiting any state
from denying to any persons within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
The object of the fourteenth amendment being to enforce the equality of the races before the law, but was not
intended to enforce social, as distinguished from political
equality.
It was accordingly found constitutional in a U. S.
case of Betronneau v. Board of Education in 3 Woods
177 when they found that, "Law providing separate public
schools for white and colored children is constitutional.
U. S. v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal.
36, 17 Am. Rep. 408; Corby v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17
Am. Rep. 738;- Dallas v. Fosdick, 40 How Prac. 249 (N
Y.); State v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178.
AUsTIN J. BARLOW.

